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council coverage in the first decade of democracy is characterised by an erosion of 
coverage	within	the	private	sector	bargaining	council	system	on	the	one	hand	and	
the	rapid	rise	of	this	system	of	bargaining	in	the	public	sector.	The	descriptive	data	
and multivariate models show therefore a significant wage premium associated with 
coverage under public sector councils in 2005, in excess of the large and significant 
union	wage	premium.	The	decline	in	the	bargaining	council	system	in	the	private	sector	
is	accompanied	by	declining	wage	premia	for	formal	sector	workers	covered	under	
private sector bargaining council agreements, with our preferred specification in 2005 
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a specific sector and area. Worker interests are therefore represented at a bargaining 
council	by	the	party	trade	unions.	Both	trade	unions	and	bargaining	councils	have	
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satisfied that the parties to the Industrial Council were sufficiently representative of the 
employers	and	employees	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Council.	For	an	agreement	to	be	

























specific period and undertook investigations and made recommendations to the Minister 


















































The councils appointed full-time officials to staff the council in order to attend to its day-
to-day	operations.	These	usually	included	a	secretary,	a	number	of	designated	agents,	
and administrative personnel. The majority of the councils were financed by a levy 
(usually	prescribed	in	the	main	agreement)	imposed	on	all	employers	and	employees	
within	the	council’s	jurisdiction	(Godfrey,	1992:	8).	
Some councils established benefit funds (for example, pension funds and sick pay 
funds) in the main agreement or in separate agreements. Benefit fund agreements 
were	generally	not	renegotiated	very	often	and	remained	in	place	much	longer	than	the	
main	agreement.	Councils	usually	established	sub-committees	to	oversee	the	operation	


































council agreements. Another identified failure of the industrial council system was the 
limited	number	of	national	industry-wide	councils	that	were	created,	which	was	mostly	
the	result	of	the	domination	by	craft	councils	(Godfrey,	1992:	18,	19).	


















introduction of the new Industrial Conciliation Act in 1937 and continued to reflect racial 












































amended the Industrial Conciliation Act to change the definition of an “employee” to 
include	African	workers	with	permanent	urban	residency.	Following	much	criticism,	
the	Act	was	amended	a	second	time	in	1979	to	include	African	contract	workers	



































a series of mergers as affiliates sought to comply with COSATU’s policy of one union in 
one	industry.	However,	the	established	industrial	councils	were	not	adequately	prepared	















 2.1  Bargaining Councils in the Labour Relations Environment since 1994
The	incoherent	and	inconsistent,	and	in	many	cases,	still	racist,	system	of	industrial	
relations	which	characterised	the	pre-1994	era	was	clearly	in	need	of	significant	
overhaul	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 democratic	 rule.	 Within	 the	 labour	 market	 policy	
environment,	the	immediate	period	following	the	election	of	the	majority	government	
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was	characterised	by	a	frantic	process	of	recasting	the	country’s	labour	regulatory	
environment.	The	outcome	of	these	negotiations	between	employers	and	employees	








The purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour 
peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objectives of 




























council; and if the parties to the council are sufficiently representative of the sector and 
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private sector who are classified as semi-skilled or unskilled and working for employees. 
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 3.  The Nature of Wage Formation in the South African    























































Chamber are covered by firm-level or mine-level collective bargaining agreements (See 
Godfrey,	2007	for	more	detail).	For	example,	while	the	majority	of	platinum	producers	
are members of the Chamber, the industry is mostly covered by company specific 
agreements.	The	main	employers	in	the	diamond	mining	industry	are	also	Chamber	
	 This	section	on	non-statutory	centralised	bargaining	draws	on	Godfrey,	2007



















and bargains with national groups, medium-sized firms as well as small firms. The 





levels depending on the core business of the firms. Certain companies negotiate at a 
central	level	for	different	sub-sectors,	while	others	negotiate	at	plant-level.
Ultimately,	 though,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 wage	 formation	 in	 South	Africa	 is	


















councils (Godfrey et al, 2006: 1). The extension to non-parties was the subject of fierce 
debate	in	the	mid-1990s	in	terms	of	the	unintended	consequence	it	ostensibly	had	in	
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 4.  Data and Descriptive Overview
 4.1  Data Sources and the Construction of Industrial and Bargaining    
  Council Coverage
In	order	to	be	able	evaluate	the	wage	premium	(if	any)	associated	with	membership	























of workers. These are captured by the three digit International Standard Classification 
of	Occupations	(ISCO	88)	codes,	two	digit	Compact	Economic	Sector	Codes	and	three	
digit	district	code.	The	occupation	categories	in	the	OHS	are	broad	and	do	not	include	
specific job titles as in the LFS. The industry categories in the OHS are also broader 
than	those	in	the	LFS,	as	it	is	recorded	by	a	two	digit	code	and	not	the	more	detailed	
three	digit	code.	This	meant	that	the	occupations	and	industries	used	to	estimate	
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of	Occupations	(SASCO)	code.	In	addition,	the	area	of	residence	of	the	worker	is	
captured,	but	not	the	work	district.	



































departure into our ability to analyse the nature and influence of this particular labour 
market	institution.
 4.2  Bargaining Council Membership, Employment and Earnings:

















Broad Labour Force 13,754 20,100 6,346 46.14
Employment 9,515 12,301 2,786 29.28
Broad Unemployment 4,239 7,800 3,561 84.01
Employed:
Formal 8,120 8,039 -81 -1
Non-formal











Our definition of non-formal sector employment includes all workers that are either in 
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Table 2:  Estimated Bargaining Council Coverage, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
Total Formal Employment 8,120,279 8,039,401
Total BC Coverage 1,193,597 2,580,331
Total BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 14.70% 32.10%
Private Sector Bargaining Council Coverage 1,193,597 1,072,399
Private Sector BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment) 14.70% 13.34%
Government Bargaining Council Coverage 1,507,932






construction.12 In 1995, the textile industry accounted for the fifth largest bargaining 
council coverage. Together the top five industries accounted for 10,5 percent of total 
coverage.	In	2005,	the	textile	industry	was	replaced	by	the	councils	for	the	road	freight	
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1995 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Managers 2005 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
1995 0.3 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.1 1.9
Professionals 2005 1.0 0.1 2.1 3.4 26.9 51.9 28.9
1995 4.4 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6
Clerical Workers 2005 4.9 2.0 7.4 9.3 28.3 12.5 10.2
1995 0.0 0.0 55.5 0.0 0.0 43.9 13.5
Service & Sales Workers 2005 1.1 0.6 41.1 5.3 7.6 16.7 15.0
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Skilled Agriculture
& Fishing Workers 2005 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3
1995 28.0 70.6 32.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.9
Craft & Trade Workers 2005 37.0 70.4 37.4 8.4 1.9 2.7 17.2
1995 51.7 4.7 0.5 96.0 0.0 2.7 32.8
Operators & Assemblers 2005 36.6 3.5 3.3 62.0 2.6 2.4 13.3
1995 15.6 19.8 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 11.8
Elementary Workers 2005 19.4 23.4 7.7 11.5 32.7 13.6 15.0
1995 591,321 230,279 271,370 76,188 1,192 23,248 1,193,597
BC members 2005 486,583 114,228 332,664 179,200 84,124 1,358,171 2,580,331
1995 1,362,063 374,420 1,367,718 431,020 530,455 2,117,455 8,120,279
Formal Employment 2005 1,394,240 536,160 1,630,919 429,091 1,087,271 1,901,858 8,039,401
1995 43.41 61.50 19.84 17.68 0.22 1.10 14.70 BC as share of
Formal Employment 2005 35.72 30.51 24.32 41.58 15.86 64.14 31.78
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Private Sector BC (%) 2005 96.5 73.8 94.8 89.7 19.6 1.9 41.6
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Sector BC (%) 2005 3.5 26.2 5.2 10.3 80.4 98.1 58.5
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:	 Private	Households,	Agriculture,	Mining	and	Utilities	were	omitted	from	the	table,	but	included	in		 	
  figures for total employment and total bargaining council coverage.
	 A	small	number	of	Domestic	Workers	were	recorded	as	working	in	Financial	and	Commercial		 	
	 Services	in	1995.	The	occupation	category	was	omitted	from	the	table,	but	these	workers		 	
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Table 4:  Bargaining Council Coverage by Occupation Group and Sector – % Share of    
  Occupation Group 
Source:		 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:	 Private	Households,	Agriculture,	Mining	and	Utilities	were	omitted	from	the	table,	but	included	in		 	
  figures for total employment and total bargaining council coverage.
	 A	small	number	of	Domestic	Workers	were	recorded	as	working	in	Financial	and	Commercial		 	
	 Services	in	1995.	The	occupation	category	was	omitted	from	the	table,	but	these	workers		 	
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Table	5	shows	the	union	membership	inside	and	outside	the	bargaining	council	
environment	in	1995	and	2005.16	
Table 5:  Bargaining Council Status and Union Membership, 1995 and 2005
Bargaining Council Non-Bargaining Council Formal Employment
Union Non-Union Total Union Non-Union Total Union Non-Union Total
1995 466,827 726,770 1,193,597 2,274,483 4,652,199 6,926,682 2,741,311 5,378,968 8,120,279
39.11% 60.89% 100% 32.84% 67.16% 100% 33.76% 66.24% 100%
2005 1,407,344 1,172,987 2,580,331 1,609,057 3,850,012 5,459,070 3,016,401 5,023,000 8,039,401













patterns	of	institutionalised	wage	formation	in	post-apartheid South Africa. In the first 
instance	the	level	of	institutionalised	wage	bargaining,	outside	of	union	membership,	
only covered 15 percent of workers in 1995. A decade later this figure, although more 
than	doubling,	stood	only	at	32	percent.	Put	differently,	the	system	of	bargaining	
councils	in	South	Africa	designed	to	formalise	the	relationship	between	organised	
workers and employers with regard to wages; benefits; dispute resolution and other 
aspects	of	labour	market	regulation,	remains	relatively	weak	and	unrepresentative	at	
the	national	level.	That	being	said,	a	second	key	conclusion	from	the	above	is	that,	

















































Table 6:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Race, Gender and Bargaining    
    Council Membership, 1995 and 2005










African 2043.32 2076.94 1:1.02 2996.83 2158.82 1:0.72* 46.66** 3.94
Coloured 2312.64 2070.22 1:0.90 3225.45 2794.53 1:0.87 39.47** 34.99**
Asian 2842.48 4001.30 1:1.41* 3908.88 3427.78 1:0.88 37.52 -14.33
White 5680.86 6221.95 1:1.10 5618.87 6961.31 1:1.24* -1.09 11.88
Male 2953.47 3142.55 1:1.06 3396.83 3398.64 1:1.00 15.01** 8.15
Female 1842.82 2695.76 1:1.46* 3499.99 3038.92 1:0.87 89.93** 12.73
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:			 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes:  * Difference between mean wages significant at the five percent level
  ** Changes significant at the 5 percent level
In	2005,	however,	African	employees	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement	
earned significantly more than those workers not belonging to a bargaining council, 
driven by a statistically significant increase of 47 percent in real earnings between 
1995	and	2005.	The	differences	in	the	earnings	of	Coloured	and	Asian	workers	inside	
and outside the bargaining council environment are not statistically significant. It is 
interesting	to	note	that	White	workers	who	did	not	belong	to	a	bargaining	council	
earned	more	than	those	that	were	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement,	with	
the difference statistically significant. This is probably a reflection of the relatively large 
share	of	White	workers	in	highly	skilled	occupations	falling	outside	the	bargaining	
council	system.






agreement. However, female bargaining council members saw a statistically significant 
increase	of	almost	90	percent	in	their	mean	earnings	between	1995	and	2005.	
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significant, with public sector bargaining council members earning about 30 percent 
more	than	workers	not	part	of	any	bargaining	council,	while	the	difference	was	almost	
90	percent	between	the	public	and	private	sector	bargaining	council	members.	
Table 7:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Race, Gender:  Private vs Public Sector Bargaining 
  Council Membership, 2005





African 2158.82 1738.45 3829.55 1:2.20* 1:1.77*
Coloured 2794.53 2510.62 4017.41 1:1.60* 1:1.44*
Asian 3427.78 3382.69 4582.80 1:1.35 1:1.34
White 6961.31 4481.74 6220.84 1:1.39* 1:0.89
Male 3398.64 2560.05 4296.07 1:1.68* 1:1.26*
Female 3038.92 1521.38 4220.95 1:2.77* 1:1.39*
Total 3271.79 2286.87 4257.43 1:1.86* 1:1.30*
Source:		 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes:  * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level








were statistically significant, with the public sector workers earning almost 40 percent 
more.	The	difference	in	earnings	between	White	workers	belonging	to	a	bargaining	
council and those within a public sector bargaining council is not statistically significant. 
In terms of our gender estimates, females benefited most from public sector bargaining 
council	membership,	with	these	workers	earning	almost	three	times	as	much	as	
females	belonging	to	private	councils	and	almost	40	percent	more	than	females	who	
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did	not	belong	to	any	bargaining	council.	Men	who	belonged	to	public	sector	bargaining	
councils	earned	on	average	about	two-thirds	more	than	those	in	private	councils	and	
almost a third more than males not within a bargaining council. Overall, this reflects the 
premium	earned	by	professionals	such	as	nurses	and	teachers	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	




differences statistically significant. Elementary Workers not part of a bargaining council 
earned	about	60	percent	of	the	average	wage	of	a	bargaining	council	member	in	1995,	
and	about	56	percent	of	the	average	wage	of	a	bargaining	council	member	in	2005.			
In 2005, the only other occupation category that benefited from being covered by a 
bargaining	council	agreement	were	Service	and	Sales	Workers,	whose	earnings	were	
almost	double	those	of	non-bargaining	council	service	workers.	This	can	be	attributed	to	
the fact that police officers and correctional services workers (who fall in this category), 
were	covered	by	the	new	public	sector	bargaining	councils	in	2005	but	uncovered	in	
1995.
 Table 8:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Occupation and Bargaining
 
         Council Membership, 1995 and 2005








Managers 5737.10 8854.87 1:1.54* 3444.90 9578.95 1:2.78* -39.95 8.18
Professionals 7827.58 5505.90 1:0.70* 5345.21 6553.86 1:1.23* -31.71** 19.03
Clerks 2941.33 3029.92 1:1.03 3868.12 3273.02 1:0.85 31.51** 8.02
Service Workers 2239.59 2479.59 1:1.11 3006.73 1597.00 1:0.53* 34.25 -35.59**
Skilled Agr.
Workers 2521.79 2120.47 2750.13 1:1.30 9.05
Craft & Trade
Workers 3091.59 3267.50 1:1.06 2452.81 2219.72 1:0.90 -20.66 -32.07**
Operators &
Assemblers 2436.65 2082.94 1:0.85* 2379.27 2121.28 1:0.89 -2.35 1.84
Elementary
Workers 1665.31 993.96 1:0.60* 2042.01 1149.60 1:0.56* 22.62 15.66**
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:		 	OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes:  * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
  ** Changes significant at the 5 percent level
Operators	and	Assemblers	covered	by	a	bargaining	council	agreement	earned	more	
than	those	outside	bargaining	councils	in	1995,	with	the	difference	no	longer	statistically	
significant in 2005. In 1995, the very small number of Professionals who belonged to a 



















Table 9:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Occupation Group:  Private versus Public Sector  
  Bargaining Council Membership, 2005
Non-BC Private BC Public BC
Ratio




Professionals 6553.86 3484.41 5382.01 1:1.54* 1:0.82*
Clerks 3273.02 3010.72 4103.71 1:1.36 1:1.25*
Service Workers 1597.00 1904.62 3799.76 1:2.00* 1:2.38*
Skilled Agr Workers 2750.13 2120.47 1:0.77
Craft & Trade Workers 2219.72 2458.70 2412.40 1:0.98 1:1.09
Operators & Assemblers 2121.28 2218.76 3189.78 1:1.44 1:1.50
Elementary Workers 1149.60 1968.76 2091.25 1:1.06 1:1.82*
Total 3271.79 2286.87 4257.43 1:1.86* 1:1.30*
Source:			 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes:  * Difference between mean wages significant at the 5 percent level
The	mean	earnings	of	Service	Workers	in	the	public	sector	were	double	that	of	Service	
Workers	that	belonged	to	private	sector	bargaining	councils	and	almost	two-and-a-half	
times more than that of their colleagues outside the council system. This reflects the 
wage premium earned by police officers and prison wardens in the public sector. 
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When	earnings	are	differentiated	by	industry	(Table	10),	it	is	clear	that	in	most	cases	
differences	in	earnings	between	workers	covered	by	bargaining	councils	and	those	




Table 10:  Real Mean Monthly Earnings by Industry and Bargaining Council Status, 
     1995 and 2005










Agriculture 789.32 1707.75 950.03 1:0.56* 20.36
Mining & Quarrying 3176.01 2820.05 3310.10 1:1.17 4.22
Manufacturing 2680.99 3870.90 1:1.44* 2298.83 3819.50 1:1.66* -14.25 -1.33
Utilities 4384.73 2956.54 4585.29 1:1.55 4.57
Construction 2658.29 2531.11 1:0.95 2319.21 2066.21 1:0.89 -12.76 -18.37
Wholesale & Retail Trade 2612.20 2457.50 1:0.94 2235.11 2377.66 1:1.06 -14.44 -3.25
Transport 2529.67 4045.35 1:1.60* 2603.98 4587.15 1:1.76* 2.94 13.39
Financial & Business
Services 1153.98 4570.14 1:3.96* 4070.34 4689.15 1:1.15 252.72** 2.60
Commercial, Social
& Prof Services 3953.48 3628.25 1:0.92 4317.75 4602.46 1:1.07 9.21 26.85**
Total 2674.38 2982.25 1:1.12 3438.74 3271.79 1:0.95 28.58** 9.71
Source:			 OHS	1995,	LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA)
Notes:  * Difference between mean wages significant at the five percent level
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analysis of earnings, in turn, suggests firstly that at the mean, there was no significant 
remunerative	advantage	offered	to	being	associated	with	a	bargaining	council.	Closer	
inspection	of	the	mean	earnings	of	bargaining	council	members,	however,	revealed	
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 5.  Bargaining Council Membership and Wages - 














other variables, a number of household specific variables that would impact on an 
individual’s	decision	to	enter	the	labour	market.	Once	the	participants	are	determined,	
an	employment	probit	model	is	estimated,	conditional	on	labour	force	participation.	
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	 	 	 	 (3)
where	Qi 	and	Qi’ refer to the specific quantiles or percentiles for the dependent 
variable,	Yi  . The coefficient, (bi-bi’) therefore represents the influence of the percentile 
difference	in	the	independent	variable	on	the	dispersion	in	the	dependent	variable.22	The	
coefficients indicate if a variable is significant or not and if the variable is significantly 
different	from	zero,	its	sign	indicates	whether	it	increases	or	reduces	the	distribution	in	
wages across the two selected percentiles. In our analysis the coefficients will indicate 






























This serves as the first specification for the earnings function for 2005. The second 





Looking at the second last variable first, the coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio (empl_










on the dependent variable should be calculated as (ее  - 1), with е the coefficient estimate (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980: 
7-75).
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Table 11:  Earnings Equation 1995 (Formal Employment)





No education to Incomplete GET (None to Grade 8) 0.0376*
Complete GET (Grade 9 to 11) 0.0966*









Craft and Trade Workers 0.2498*





Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.1667*
Transport 0.0708*
Finance 0.0034




Log of hours worked per month 0.1331*
Bargaining council/union member 0.0236








Notes:  * Significant at the one percent level
  ** Significant at the five percent level
  Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
A	set	of	provincial	dummies	were	included	in	the	equation,	but	are	not	presented	
in Table 11. With the exception of Limpopo, for which the coefficient is statistically 
























premium relative to those not covered by a wage agreement. The statistically significant 
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Ultimately,	 this	 result	 for	 1995	 suggests	 that	 bargaining	 councils	 impacted	






2005, two specifications of the earnings function were estimated. In tems of the first 
specification, the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (empl_lambda)	is	again	negative	
and statistically significant, confirming that there was sample selection bias which was 
corrected	for.
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Table 12:  Earnings Equation 2005 (Formal Employment)
Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:  * Significant at the one percent level
  ** Significant at the five percent level




degree in 2005. The LFS no longer records information by urban-rural classification, 
but	by	district	and	metropolitan	council.	The	metro	dummy	is	one	for	all	workers	living	
in	metropolitan	municipalities	and	zero	for	those	living	outside	these	areas	(in	areas	0
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dummies, the coefficients for the Transport and the Financial Services sectors are 
not statistically significant. Formal employees in Agriculture, Construction, Wholesale 
&	Retail	Trade,	as	well	as	Private	Households	earned	less	relative	to	formal	sector	
employees	in	Manufacturing.	Workers	in	Mining	and	Utilities,	on	the	other	hand,	earned	
more than those working in Manufacturing. The statistically significant and positive 
coefficient for the public sector CSPS dummy captures the wage premium enjoyed 
by workers in the public sector. The coefficient for the private sector is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that private sector workers in that sector earned less 
that those employed in the Manufacturing sector. The positive and significant coefficient 
for	experience	indicates	that	an	additional	year	of	experience	generated	a	return	to	








setting in South Africa in the first specification. The coefficient for the bargaining council/
non-union member dummy is statistically insignificant, indicating that a formal sector 
worker	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreement	but	not	a	member	of	a	union,	did	
not enjoy a wage premium in 2005. Both the coefficients for the union membership 
dummy	and	the	bargaining	council/union	member	dummy	are	positive	and	statistically	
significant. Union membership on its own is associated with an earnings premium of 





positive and significant coefficient for the CSPS public sector dummy does suggest 
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that	being	a	public	sector	worker	is	associated	with	an	earnings	premium	relative	to	







variables are almost identical to those in the first specification. The estimated coefficient 
for the CSPS dummy, however, is negative and significant, which was expected given 
the	results	from	specification	(1).	This	implies	that	the	average	earnings	of	CSPS	
workers lagged those found within Manufacturing. The coefficient for the private sector 
bargaining	dummy	is	insignificant,	again	implying	that	if	you	worked	in	the	private	
sector,	membership	of	a	bargaining	council	did	not	award	you	a	wage	premium	in	2005.	






significant. The union wage gap is significant in 1995 and for both specifications in 
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clearly by the results from the second specification. While system membership of a 
private	sector	bargaining	council	did	not	yield	any	premium,	membership	of	the	public	
sector	bargaining	councils	was	associated	with	a	wage	premium	of	28	percent.	








members of PSBC ensured a high and significant return to their earnings in 2005. The 











At all five points (and at the mean) of the earnings distribution being African, resulted 
in	lower	earnings	relative	to	the	other	three	race	groups.	The	magnitudes	of	the	
coefficients vary slightly across the quantiles, but at all points Whites enjoyed the largest 
wage	differential,	followed	by	Asians	and	Coloureds.	The	negative	and	statistically	
significant coefficients for the female dummy suggest gender discrimination across the 









distribution. There are a few exceptions, with the coefficient of the dummy for KwaZulu-
Natal not significant at the 90th percentile, while the coefficients for the Limpopo dummy 
are insignificant at the 25th	and	the	50th percentile. For Limpopo, the coefficients at the 
75th	and	the	90th percentile are positive and significant; implying that these workers at 
the	top	of	the	wage	distribution	earned	more	than	their	colleagues	in	Gauteng.
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distributions in each sector. The coefficients for experience and experience squared 
are very similar to the coefficients estimated at the mean at the different points of the 
distribution.
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Table 13:  Earnings Functions Estimates, 1995
Quantile ( ) =  Dependent Variable:
Log of monthly earnings OLS 0.10 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Coloured 0.196* 0.161* 0.173* 0.149* 0.185* 0.215*
Asian 0.260* 0.272* 0.252* 0.224* 0.254* 0.282*
White 0.556* 0.518* 0.527* 0.535* 0.579* 0.573*
Female -0.230* -0.165* -0.182* -0.205* -0.233* -0.234*
None to Incomplete GET
(None - Grade 8) 0.038* 0.047* 0.046* 0.035* 0.033* 0.031*
Complete GET
(Grade 9 - 11) 0.097* 0.084* 0.081* 0.089* 0.100* 0.100*
Matric (Grade 12) 0.190* 0.199* 0.178* 0.175* 0.174* 0.194*
Diploma 0.153* 0.089** 0.121* 0.168* 0.169* 0.152*
Degree 0.117* 0.090* 0.116* 0.115* 0.140* 0.196*
Urban 0.132* 0.169* 0.146* 0.131* 0.108* 0.086*
Managers 0.726* 0.654* 0.704* 0.705* 0.771* 0.749*
Professionals 0.537* 0.546* 0.564* 0.525* 0.557* 0.554*
Clerks 0.277* 0.305* 0.299* 0.279* 0.267* 0.266*
Service Workers 0.175* 0.091* 0.139* 0.187* 0.244* 0.281*
Skilled Agricultural 0.473* -0.027 0.385* 0.574* 0.679* 0.705*
Craft & Trade Workers 0.250* 0.216* 0.255* 0.252* 0.289* 0.362*
Operators & Assemblers 0.170* 0.190* 0.171* 0.159* 0.165* 0.196*
Agriculture -0.697* -0.661* -0.751* -0.771* -0.752* -0.654*
Mining -0.005 -0.034 -0.046 -0.038 -0.073* -0.038
Utilities 0.157* 0.157** 0.206* 0.157* 0.089 0.115
Construction -0.149* -0.170* -0.196* -0.188* -0.155* -0.139*
Wholesale & Retail Trade -0.167* -0.133* -0.164* -0.188* -0.201* -0.173*
Transport 0.071* 0.173* 0.101* 0.030 0.004 -0.002
Finance 0.003 0.062 0.017 -0.013 -0.037 -0.023
CSPS 0.021 0.091* 0.035 0.000 -0.049** -0.068*
Private Households -0.712* -0.752* -0.827* -0.785* -0.697* -0.551*
Experience 0.034* 0.032* 0.032* 0.032* 0.033* 0.036*
Experience squared -0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
Log of hours (per month) 0.133* 0.243* 0.155* 0.093* 0.079* 0.049**
BC/union member 0.024 0.061 0.030 0.027 -0.022 -0.016
BC/non-union member 0.069* 0.061 0.043** 0.055* 0.059* 0.067**
Union 0.196* 0.301* 0.240* 0.166* 0.144* 0.091*
Emp_lambda -0.115* -0.320* -0.269* -0.208* -0.035 -0.037
Constant 5.374* 4.179* 5.036* 5.762* 6.032* 6.419*
Number Observed 24479 24479 24479 24479 24479 24479
Pseudo R2 0.652 0.4322 0.4543 0.4401 0.4273 0.4026
Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:  * Significant at the one percent level
  ** Significant at the five percent level
  Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
Turning to the coefficients of the dummies that capture bargaining council and union 
membership, the coefficient of the dummy presenting bargaining council membership 
together	with	union	membership	remain	insignificant	across	the	distribution.	This	
means	that	membership	of	both	a	bargaining	council	and	a	union	at	the	same	time	
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did	not	have	any	impact	on	a	formally	employed	worker’s	earnings	at	any	point	of	
the	wage	distribution	in	1995.	The	coefficient	of	the	dummy	capturing	bargaining	
council membership without union membership is not statistically significant at the 
10th percentile. It is, however significant at the 25th,	50th,	75th	and	90th	percentile,	with	
the	magnitude	increasing	towards	the	top	of	the	distribution.	This	implies	that	at	the	
very bottom of the wage distribution, workers did not benefit from being a member 
of	a	bargaining	council	in	1995.	Thus,	the	bargaining	council	premium	for	non-union	
members is significant for most of the wage distribution and, notably, remains so even 
at	the	90th percentile. Hence, while the OLS estimates confirmed a significant bargaining 
council/non-union	impact	at	the	mean,	we	suggest	here	that	this	impact	holds	true	
across	the	entire	wage	distribution,	barring	those	individuals	at	the	10th	percentile.	In	
addition, the coefficients of the union membership dummy are positive and significant 
across the entire distribution. The fact that the size of the coefficients decline across the 
wage	distribution	suggests,	as	would	be	expected,	that	the	magnitude	of	the	premia	in	
1995	was	highest	amongst	those	workers	in	the	bottom	half	of	the	wage	distribution.	
Given the focus of the paper, the derived coefficients (if statistically significant) for the 
bargaining	council/union,	bargaining	council/non-union	and	union	variables	at	different	
points	in	the	wage	distribution	in	1995	are	shown	in	Figure	2.	In	addition,	we	also	
display the mean OLS estimates. In all cases these OLS coefficients are presented 
by the relevant horizontal lines. The coefficient for bargaining council membership in 
combination with union membership is insignificant at all points of the wage distribution, 
and	at	the	mean	as	discussed	above	and	are	therefore	not	included	in	Figure	2.	
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Figure 2:  Estimates of Bargaining Council and Union Membership Impact on Earnings by   























































statistically significant across the distribution with the exception of the 95th	percentile.	
The estimated coefficients indicate, of course, that union members earned more that 
their	non-unionised	counterparts.	In	addition,	the	downward	trend	implies	that	in	1995,	
relatively	low-earning	(and	disproportionately	unskilled)	workers	at	the	bottom	end	of	
the distribution benefited more from belonging to a union than better-earning, higher 
skilled	workers.













is not significant at the very top of the distribution. The results by provinces are not 
displayed	in	Table14.	With	the	exception	of	the	Western	Cape	at	the	10th,	25th,	50th	
and	90th	percentile,	and	the	Eastern	Cape	at	the	10th percentile, all coefficients for all 
provinces are negative and statistically significant, meaning that workers living outside 
Gauteng	earned	less	than	those	that	resided	in	the	province.
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Table 14:  Earnings Function Estimates, 2005
Source:	 LFS	2005:	2	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:  * Significant at the one percent level
  ** Significant at the five percent level
  Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
As in 1995, the coefficients for the Managers, Professionals and Clerks are positive 
and significant across the distribution, with the magnitudes relatively stable. This means 
that,	as	expected,	workers	in	these	occupation	groups	earned	more	that	Elementary	
Workers across the distribution. The coefficient of the dummy for Service Workers only 
becomes significant at the 50th percentile. The positive coefficients at the 50th,	75th	and	
90th	percentile	mean	that	Service	Workers	in	the	top	half	of	the	wage	distribution	earned	
more than Elementary Workers. The coefficient for agricultural workers is not significant 0
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membership are statistically insignificant at all estimated percentiles of the distribution. 
In	other	words,	workers	in	the	private	sector	did	not	enjoy	any	wage	premium	
associated	with	membership	of	private	sector	bargaining	council	in	2005,	thus,	
reinforcing the OLS estimate. The coefficients for the public sector bargaining council 
membership are positive and significant across the wage distribution. The size of the 
coefficient increases slightly from the 10th	to	the	25th	percentile,	before	declining	towards	
the	top	of	the	distribution.	Again,	this	suggests	that	workers	in	the	bottom	half	of	the	
distribution benefited more from being covered by public sector bargaining council wage 
agreements. The coefficients of the union membership dummy are also again positive 







The coefficient for the private bargaining council dummy is statistically insignificant at 
the	mean	as	well	as	across	the	wage	distribution,	with	the	notable	exception	(although	
not	shown	in	Table	14)	of	the	5th percentile. The fact that the coefficient is significant at 







of the nascent public service bargaining councils. The coefficient for the dummy is, thus, 
positive and significant at the mean as well as at all points in the earnings distribution. 
In	2005,	membership	of	a	public	service	bargaining	council	offered	a	wage	premium	of	
between	18	percent	and	34	percent.	This	public	service	bargaining	council	wage	gap	
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increased	from	the	5th	percentile	to	the	35th	percentile,	before	declining	to	the	lowest	
point	at	the	95th	percentile	(apart	from	a	spike	around	the	60th	and	65th	percentile).
Figure 3:  Estimates of Bargaining Council and Union Membership Impact on Earnings by   



























































in earnings, specifically between the 90th	and	the	10th	percentiles,	the	90th	and	the	50th	





inequality. The coefficients for the dummy representing membership of a bargaining 
council only are insignificant for all three inter-quantile estimates in 1995. This means 
that	in	1995	wage	agreements	negotiated	in	bargaining	councils	did	not	contribute	
to	altering	earnings	inequality	between	the	90th	-10th,	90th	-	50th	and	the	50th	-10th	
percentiles. This means that there is no significant difference in the wage premium 
associated	with	a	non-union	bargaining	council	member	at	the	chosen	interquantiles.	
This is consistent with the fact that at the quantiles, the coefficients did not vary much 
from	each	other	and	from	the	mean.	
The coefficient for the dummy capturing bargaining council – union membership is 
significant (at the five percent level) only for the 90th	-10th	percentile	difference.	This	
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In 2005, the coefficient for union membership is again significant (at the five percent 












awarded a wage premium, with no wage benefits associated with being a member of a 
private	sector	bargaining	council.	Interestingly,	both	private	and	public	sector	bargaining	
council	membership	served	to	reduce	inequality	in	the	top	half	of	the	wage	distribution.	
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enjoy any significant benefit in terms of average earnings. The establishment of the 
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Hairdressing and Cosmetology Bargaining Council (KZN)
Bargaining	Council	for	the	Laundry,	Cleaning	and	Dyeing	Industry	(Cape)
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•	 It was difficult to get sufficient occupational information from these agreements 




•	 Individual	 provisions	 have	 been	 made	 for	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 country	






























workers were identified in the LFS























•	 Only machine operator – tyre production was identified in the LFS
Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry 
•	 No	recently	published	information
•	 Only machine operator, refining sugar was included

























•	 Occupation	 and	 industry	 coverage	 from	 Government	 Gazette	 and	 from	
agreement	available	on	BC	website
•	 It	should	be	noted	that	there	also	exists	a	National	Bargaining	Forum	for	the	


















































•	 Two  bargaining  councils  (Cape  &  KwaZulu  Natal)  with  slightly  different 
occupations	covered
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 Appendix E:  Estimated Industrial Council Coverage in the 



























Total Formal Employment  8,120,279 100
Total BC Coverage 1,193,597
Total BC Coverage (% of Total Formal Employment 15%
Workers not covered by ICs 6,926,682 85.3
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 Appendix F:  Estimated Bargaining Council Coverage in 

































Total Formal Employment 8,039,401 100
Total BC Coverage 2,580,331
Total BC Coverage (% of Formal Employment) 32%
Total BC Coverage – Government (% of Formal 
Employment)
13%
Workers not covered by BCs 5,459,070 67.9
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 Appendix G:  Broad Labour Force Participation Equation, 1995  
       and 2005
1995 2005
Marginal	Effects x-bar Marginal	Effects x-bar
Coloured -0.0246 * 0.1100 -0.0067 0.0894
Asian -0.1458 * 0.0335 -0.1590 * 0.0282
White -0.1702 * 0.1395 -0.1958 * 0.1038
Female -0.2283 * 0.5289 -0.1004 * 0.5187
25-34	years 0.1153 * 0.3232 0.3521 * 0.2687
35-44	years 0.1036 * 0.2459 0.3103 * 0.1772
45-55	years 0.0285 * 0.1471 0.2475 * 0.1326
55-65	years -0.2248 * 0.1030 0.0706 * 0.1005
No	education	to	
incomplete	GET 0.0106 * 6.2797 0.0054 * 6.8834
Complete	GET 0.0157 * 1.2661 0.0138 * 1.5510
Matric 0.0751 * 0.2752 0.1710 * 0.3078
Diploma 0.0852 * 0.0844 0.0378 0.0801
Degree 0.0089 0.0542 -0.0202 0.0646
Urban/Metro 0.0339 * 0.5891 0.0209 * 0.3755
Western	Cape -0.0246 * 0.1230 -0.0295 0.1057
Eastern	Cape -0.0950 * 0.1326 -0.0908 * 0.1346
Northern	Cape -0.0744 * 0.0240 -0.0546 * 0.0191
Free	State 0.0133 0.0685 -0.0708 * 0.0645
KwaZulu Natal -0.0920 * 0.2007 -0.0844 * 0.2046
North	West -0.0607 * 0.0871 -0.0469 * 0.0810
Limpopo -0.0421 * 0.0647 -0.0943 * 0.1068
Mpumalanga -0.1370 * 0.0866 -0.0258 ** 0.0662
No	of	children	under	7	
years	in	hh -0.0051 * 0.8549 0.0092 * 0.8020
No	of	children	aged	8-15	
yrs	in	hh
-0.0043 ** 0.7973 -0.0320 * 0.8759
No	of	adults	over	60	years	
in	hh








Notes:  * Significant at one percent level
  ** Significant at five percent level0
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Appendix H:  Formal Employment Equation, 1995 and 2005
1995 2005
Marginal	Effects x-bar Marginal	Effects x-bar
Coloured 0.1837 * 0.1131 0.2207 * 0.0948
Asian 0.2032 * 0.0310 0.2575 * 0.0279
White 0.2324 * 0.1403 0.2671 * 0.1074
Female -0.0549 * 0.4465 -0.1516 * 0.4888
25-34	years 0.0509 * 0.3648 -0.0355 0.3570
35-44	years 0.1465 * 0.2696 0.0388 0.2263
45-55	years 0.1907 * 0.1421 0.1166 * 0.1496
55-65	years 0.3433 * 0.0531 0.2469 * 0.0639
No	education	to	
incomplete	GET -0.0089 * 6.6017 0.0039 7.0179
Complete	GET 0.0076 1.4162 0.0145 * 1.7300
Matric 0.0333 * 0.3188 0.0600 * 0.3830
Diploma 0.1449 * 0.1030 0.2217 * 0.1034
Degree -0.0744 * 0.0669 -0.0112 0.0821
Urban/Metro -0.0260 * 0.6295 0.0268 * 0.4135
Western	Cape 0.0065 0.1295 0.0531 * 0.1135
Eastern	Cape -0.0848 * 0.1196 -0.0715 * 0.1191
Northern	Cape -0.0561 * 0.0229 -0.0062 0.0191
Free	State -0.0491 * 0.0751 0.0578 * 0.0638
KwaZulu Natal 0.0086 0.1869 -0.0004 0.1922
North	West -0.0095 0.0868 -0.0176 0.0814
Limpopo -0.0313 * 0.0648 -0.0181 0.0660
Mpumalanga -0.0177 0.0734 -0.0732 * 0.0934













Notes:  * Significant at one percent level
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Appendix I:  Inter-Quantile Determinants of Earnings, 1995
90th-10th 90th-50th 50th-10th
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Coloured 0.0550 0.0512 ** 0.0038
Asian 0.0595 0.1099 * -0.0505
White 0.0461 0.0266 0.0195








Matric	(Grade	12) -0.0381 0.0012 -0.0394 **
Diploma 0.0518 -0.0387 0.0904 **
Degree 0.0986 * 0.0726 * 0.0260
Urban -0.0898 * -0.0474 * -0.0424 **
Western	Cape 0.0966 * 0.0307 0.0659
Eastern	Cape 0.2226 * 0.0942 * 0.1285 *
Northern	Cape 0.0640 0.0746 -0.0106
Free	State 0.2231 * 0.0958 * 0.1274 *
KwaZulu Natal 0.0885 * 0.0494 0.0391
North	West 0.2045 * 0.0741 * 0.1304 *
Limpopo 0.2323 * 0.1528 * 0.0794 **
Mpumalanga 0.1282 ** 0.0611 ** 0.0672* **
Managers 0.1466 ** 0.0446 0.1020
Professionals -0.0022 -0.0060 0.0038
Clerks -0.0353 -0.0398 0.0045
Service	Workers 0.1638 * 0.0882 * 0.0756* **
Skilled	Agricultural 0.4731 * 0.0784 0.3947 **
Craft	and	Trade	Workers 0.1440 * 0.0769 * 0.0671 **
Operators	and	Assemblers 0.0181 0.0037 0.0143
Agriculture -0.0124 0.0865 -0.0989 *
Mining -0.1190 ** -0.0774 ** -0.0416
Utilities -0.1115 -0.1481 ** 0.0366
Construction -0.0075 0.0383 -0.0458
Wholesale	and	Retail	
Trade -0.0519 0.0011 -0.0530
Transport -0.1901 * -0.0640 -0.1261 *
Finance	 -0.0732 -0.0017 -0.0715
Commercial,	Social	and	
Personal	Services
-0.1692 * -0.0766 * -0.0926 *
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Private	Households 0.2069 0.2434 ** -0.0366
Experience 0.0031 0.0051 ** -0.0020
Experience	squared 4.22E-06 -6.7E-05 7.07E-05
Log	of	hours	worked	per	
month
-0.1987 * -0.03 -0.1687 *
Bargaining	council/union	




Union -0.2294 * -0.0737 * -0.1558 *
Employment	lambda 0.2462 ** 0.1430 0.1032
Constant 2.3470 * 0.6576 * 1.6894 *
Number	of	Observations 24479 24479 24479
High	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.3976 0.3976 0.4512
Low	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.4286 0.4512 0.4286
Source:	 OHS	1995	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:  * Significant at the one percent level
  ** Significant at the five percent level
  Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table
DPRU Working Paper 09/135          Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen & Sumayya Goga
Appendix J:  Inter-Quantile Determinants of Earnings, 2005
90-10th 90th-50th 50th-10th
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Coloured 0.066 -0.008 0.074
Asian 0.043 -0.042 0.085
White 0.257** 0.035 0.223*




Complete	GET	(Grade	9	to	11) 0.054** 0.027* 0.027
Matric	(Grade	12) 0.183* 0.104* 0.080
Diploma -0.093 -0.093 0.000
Degree 0.060 0.050** 0.010
Metro -0.026 -0.041 0.015
Western	Cape -0.140** -0.074** -0.067
Eastern	Cape -0.113** -0.024 -0.090
Northern	Cape 0.004 -0.007 0.012
Free	State 0.087 -0.006 0.094
KwaZulu Natal 0.058 -0.021 0.079
North	West -0.040 -0.011 -0.029
Limpopo 0.100** 0.032 0.068
Mpumalanga -0.012 -0.003 -0.010
Managers 0.335* 0.162** 0.172*
Professionals -0.023 -0.049 0.026
Clerks 0.076 -0.033 0.110*
Service	Workers 0.189* 0.044 0.145*
Skilled	Agricultural 0.299** 0.229** 0.070
Craft	and	Trade	Workers 0.102 0.038 0.065
Operators	and	Assemblers 0.022 0.008 0.014
Agriculture -0.412* -0.247* -0.165*
Mining -0.177* -0.203* 0.026
Utilities 0.277 0.046 0.232
Construction -0.103* -0.042 -0.061**
Wholesale	and	Retail	Trade -0.163* -0.104* -0.059
Transport 0.117 0.000 0.117
Finance	 -0.134** -0.077 -0.058
CSPS -0.040 -0.098* 0.058
Private	Households -0.506* -0.410* -0.096
Experience 0.015* 0.006 0.009
Experience	squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log	of	hours	worked	per	month -0.102** 0.036 -0.137*
Private	Sector	BC	Member -0.058 -0.078* 0.020
Public	Sector	BC	Member -0.045 -0.095* 0.050
Union -0.247* -0.112* -0.135*
Emp_lambda 0.188 -0.030 0.218**
Analysing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market: The Role of Bargaining Councils
Constant 1.494 0.496* 0.998*
No	of	Observations 14746 14746 14746
High	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.402 0.402 0.4122
Low	Quantile	Pseudo	R2 0.238 0.4122 0.238
Source:	 LFS	2005(2)	(Statistics	SA);	Own	Calculations
Notes:  * Significant at the one percent level
  ** Significant at the five percent level
  Other and unspecified categories were omitted from the table